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Apologists for growth: passive revolutionaries in a passive revolution
Clive L. Spash
Department of Socioeconomics, Institute for the Multi-Level Governance & Development, WU Vienna University of
Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria
ABSTRACT
Popular authors and international organizations recommend transformation to
a ‘new economy’. However, this is misleadingly interpreted as radical or
revolutionary. Two problematic positions are revealed: being pro-growth
while seeking to change the current form of capitalism (e.g. Ha-Joon Chang),
and being anti-growth on environmental grounds but promoting growth for
poverty alleviation and due to agnosticism about growth (e.g. Tim Jackson
and Kate Raworth). Both positions involve contradictions and an evident
failure to address, or perhaps even a denial of, the actual operations of
capital accumulating economies. Thus, economists ostensibly critical of
capitalism turn out to be apologists for growth who conform to the
requirements of a top-down passive revolution, that leaves power relations
undisturbed and the economic structure fundamentally unchanged. The
growth economy is shown to include technocracy, productivism associated
with eugenics, inequity disguised as meritocracy, competition concealing
militarism and imperialism, imposition of development as progress, and
financialization and commodification of Nature.
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1. Introduction
A range of arguments have long been made about the problems with the growth economy. Since the
rise of the environmental movement in the 1960s, the economic growth paradigm has been subject
to social and ecological criticism which bore fruit in numerous books in the 1970s (Daly, 1973;
Easterlin, 1974; Hirsch, 1977; Meadows et al., 1972; Mishan, 1969; Schumacher, 1973; Scitovsky,
1976). A key theoretician of how the ecological economic system operates was Georgescu-Roegen
(1975/2009). His work highlighted the role of energy and materials in the reproduction of industrial
economies and how economic theory failed to take into account ecological, source and sink depen-
dencies. He noted the frivolous use of scarce resources in a consumer society, raising ethical issues
about who gets what and for what ends. The problems are social (ethical, political), ecological and econ-
omic. I will not rehearse the long standing arguments here, but note that they are the theoretical core of
ecological economics (Martinez-Alier, 2013; Røpke, 2004; Spash, 1999), which has informed steady-
state, degrowth and post-growth ideas. Over the last thirty years the social aspects of this theory
have been increasingly recognized as in need of explicit attention with corresponding links to critical
institutionalism, political ecology and political economy (see Koch & Buch-Hansen, 2020;
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Spash, 2020b). The theoretical foundations of this paper are those of the emerging social-ecological
economic paradigm that calls for radical transformation (Spash, 2017, 2011, 2020d).
A contrast is then to be drawn between reform and revolution, transition and transformation,
lifestyle choice and systems change. Mild reformists regard revelation of the failures of the domi-
nant economic system of capital accumulation (whether by USA ‘private’ or Chinese ‘public’ cor-
porations, or some hybrid of public-private partnership) as suggesting the need for new
organizational approaches and adjustments to institutional arrangements that maintain the basic
system intact and reinforce it. The neoliberal and financialized form of corporate capitalism,
that became dominant from the early 1980s, excluded the idea of alternative types of economies
for social provisioning. Questioning capitalism was no longer legitimate, as exemplified by Margret
Thatcher’s phrase ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA). However, the 2008 financial crash stimulated the
return of popular criticism of capitalism (especially neoliberalism), corporations, the financial sys-
tem and the super rich 1%. Economic theories were also targeted as requiring pluralist rethinking
(Fischer et al., 2018). A range of populist works, ‘best sellers’ and articles made their authors highly
cited under the guise of being outside the orthodoxy, radical and alternative. For example, Cam-
bridge University’s Ha-Joon Chang, an author now cited 30,000 times (Google Scholar), first
came to popular attention with his book 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism
(Chang, 2011). The reorganization of capitalism he advocates is a neo-Keynesian society with
strong central government to ameliorate the socially divisive excesses of the economic system.
Yet, all Keynesian approaches, in all their various forms, have failed to address the biophysical
basis of the economy and so chosen to unscientifically ignore reality. Even less recognized is the
type of society such pro-growth economists typically advocate, both in terms of the treatment of
Nature (reduced to a resource for human ends), role of humans in society (reduced to labourer/
consumer), human motivation (selfish interest, materialism), politics (nationalism, liberalism)
and ethics (preference utilitarianism, hedonism).
Yet, Ha-Joon Chang is just one of many claiming capitalism can be reformed and growth main-
tained for ‘the common good’ (e.g. GCEC, 2014, 2018; Jacobs & Mazzucato, 2016; OECD, 2020;
Stern et al., 2006; von der Leyen, 2019). At the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos 2020
the talk was of inclusive ‘stakeholder capitalism’, resurrecting an idea from when capitalism was
in crisis during the 1930s (Denning, 2020). This is offered as the ‘new’ hope to counter a range
of criticisms that capitalism is socially unjust, rewards an elite, dispossess the poor, supports psy-
chopathic corporations and self-serving financiers, as well as causing ecological destruction (Bakan,
2004; Bienkowski, 2013; Leonard, 1988; van Huijstee et al., 2011). Amongst the invited guest speak-
ers at Davos 2019 and 2020 was Greta Thunberg whose emotive calls to address the ‘climate emer-
gency’ have added urgency to the latest reformist ‘solutions’. Her speeches have been direct and
included strong anti-corporate elements (Aronoff, 2019), but remain unfocussed in terms of pol-
itical content and unspecific on necessary action or what to do about the powerful organizations
she is criticizing. Thus, her and others’ strong direct language of a climate catastrophe/emer-
gency/crisis can be and has been adopted and redirected by fossil fuel and corporate interests
for their own purposes (Spash, 2020c, 2020a).
While only one of many environmental problems, human induced climate change has come to
represent the failings of the current economic system. It is ever more present in the mind of
humanity as extreme weather events become more frequent, temperature records are consistently
broken year on year, ice sheets and glaciers melt, wild fires spread, and the threat of unknown cat-
astrophic events looms larger. The ‘climate emergency’ has pushed transformation to the top of the
political agenda, where it contests with other threats to the financial markets and stability of the
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world economic order, such as the Coronavirus pandemic (Spash, 2020b). The importance allo-
cated to addressing human induced climate change has led to two reactions: denialism and refram-
ing policy within terms that protect and enhance capitalism. The latter is the concern here. Direct
attempts to supress problems of fossil fuel industrialism under a capital accumulating growth econ-
omy have come from members of the Davos elite in the guise of the Global Commission on the
Economy and Climate (GCEC, 2014, 2018) and billionaire Richard Branson’s B-Team and Carbon
War Room that attempt to justify his Virgin corporation’s aerospace and airline industrial expan-
sion with carbon offsetting and trading. Financiers, bankers and super-rich entrepreneurs are
rebranded as planetary saviours in our time of crisis.
Corporations, pro-growth governments and bureaucrats, have already adopted FridaysForFu-
ture (FFF) and Extinction Rebellion (XR) calls for urgent action to advocate a range of environ-
mental ‘deals’, such as the European Commission (EC) ‘Green Deal’ (European Commission,
2019), the United Nations (UN) Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Global
Green New Deal’ (UNCTAD, 2019), and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) ‘New Deal
for Nature’ (UNEP, 2019). Continuation of the capital accumulating economic structure remains
key to these initiatives, and their aim is to organize society to fit. At the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting in Madrid, EC President,
Ursula von der Leyen (2019) announced the European Green Deal as
Europe’s new growth strategy. It will cut emissions while also creating jobs and improving our quality
of life. For that we need investment! Investment in research, in innovation, in green technologies. […]
EUR 1 trillion of investment over the next decade. […] This will include extending emission trading to
all relevant sectors. CO2 has to have a price.
The role of price-making markets, corporations and capitalism are not in question. Typical of all
these ‘deals’ are claims of coordinating and organizing stakeholders, having civil society and gov-
ernment work with, or more accurately for, ‘industry’, with promises of economic growth, jobs and
climate stability.
The top-down approach to diverting attention from the need for systems change is something
Gramsci (1971, pp. 106–114) referred to as a ‘passive revolution’. This relates to the passive inte-
gration of subordinate segments of society while keeping them powerless. The potential revolution-
ary or oppositional intellectuals and leaders are absorbed into the system (see also Candeias, 2011).
If successful those in power remain, the basic structure of the system is unchanged, and radical and
revolutionary thinkers are co-opted into powerless positions and/or support roles. What I will
argue is that just such a passive revolution is evident in populist books by self proclaimed radical
economists. For example, Kate Raworth’s Doughnut Economics, shortlisted for The Financial Times
best economics book of 2017, is entirely oriented around economic growth and criticisms of main-
stream economics, but fails to take any stand against economic growth, let alone capitalism. Tim
Jackson with over 22,000 (Google Scholar) citations produced Prosperity Without Growth, a
book that has over 7,000 cites. Yet, as I will show, he also adopts a position that advocates growth
as essential for ‘development’.
In covering and explaining these positions I address some of the silences and absences in theo-
rizing about economic growth in terms of its implications for social organization, how growth
impacts on poverty and social inequality, what are the institutional foundations of growth ideology,
how alternatives to growth are delegitimized, and in so doing specify a range of organizations
attempting to prevent transformation away from growth and the capital accumulating economy.
Geo-political and macro-economic structures and mechanisms maintaining the economic growth
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imperative are identified along the way. The paper is distinct from, but complementary to, my other
article in this forum issue of Globalizations (Spash, 2020b). There I focus on drawing out lessons
from the Coronavirus pandemic about concrete structural aspects of the operation of actual econ-
omies, which are then placed in the context of long running systems critiques from ecological econ-
omics and fallacious arguments by mainstream economists denying limits to growth. Both papers
complement others in this special issue that expose the failures of economics as a discipline (Gal-
braith, 2020; Keen, 2020) and the related necessity of and potential for alternative approaches that
connect economics to social, political and ecological reality (Gills & Morgan, 2020; Koch & Buch-
Hansen, 2020).
In order to understand why systems change is necessary, and how it might be achieved, the
structural aspects of that system must be understood, including the mechanisms by which it oper-
ates and reproduces itself. In Section 2, the organization of society to maintain a productive growth
economy is shown to have multiple unsavoury implications some of which are acknowledge while
others are rarely mentioned, such as links to eugenicist positons held by several famous economists
(e.g. Keynes, Edgeworth and Meade). The claims made for capitalism, being inclusive and provid-
ing freedom from coercion, contrast with the advocacy of a smart, competitive meritocracy and
an actualized world order built on the militarized and securitized nation State. In Section 3, the
claims for economic growth being the means to development are shown to have been part of a
foreign policy agenda of the United States of America (USA) that was adopted, maintained and
promoted via international organizations such as the UN, World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Bodies of the UN have supported the continual rebirth of economic growth – as devel-
opment, progress, sustainable development, Green growth, Green New Deal. In Section 4, I then
turn to explicit coverage of how the ecological crisis, and specifically human induced climate
change, is employed to support a new era of growth. In both Sections 3 and 4 I make explicit refer-
ence to some populist authors whose work has appeared growth critical and anti-capitalist but has
in fact been neither.
This paper reveals how various attempts by different individuals and organizations to claim that
growth is good, justifiable or even neutral, form part of a passive revolution that fails to address
some basic social and ecological realities. Economic works publicized as critical and progressive
prove to be otherwise. One set of ostensibly critical approaches to capitalism claim the right
form is all that is required to avoid problems but fail to properly consider climate and ecological
crises (e.g. Ha-Joon Chang and post-Keynesians). They also ignore the growth economy’s negative
psychological and ethical implications (that Keynes explicitly recognized), undesirable productivist
aspects, and tendency in times of crisis to foster extreme right wing political groups. Another set of
ostensibly growth critical approaches is explicitly environmentally concerned, but still advocate
policies promoting growth (e.g. Jackson, Raworth). These regard growth as necessary for ‘develop-
ment’ but pay no attention to the competitive asymmetry it entails and lack analysis of the structure
of capitalism. Their pragmatic commitment to economic growth results in maintaining capitalism
by default and contradicts concern for the evidence of material impacts and social inequities of the
system, its tendencies to exploit and create crises.
2. The social organization of humanity for growth
Since the end of World War II, the governments of all major nation States have been committed to
a macroeconomic model termed by its advocates the ‘growth economy’, and by its critics growth-
mania (Daly, 1992; Georgescu-Roegen, 1975/2009, p. 349). Built on a fossil fuel industrial economic
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structure, such growth has long been confronting environmental limits, and even longer the social
inequities created by worldwide resource extraction and the profit motive (Brand &Wissen, 2017).
Yet, it has repeatedly been adjusted and saved from ultimate collapse as explained by the French
Regulation School building from the 1976 book ‘Régulation et crises du capitalism’ (Aglietta,
1979/2015). In this section I illustrate how apparently radical heterodox economic critique of capit-
alism plays its role in a passive revolution supporting economic growth. That the recommended
economic system requires social adjustment and normalization of humans to the system and the
type of adjustments required are concealed, denied or simply ignored. Here some of these basic
social implications and potentialities are specified.
2.1. The Keynesian productivist society
The work of Ha-Joon Chang has been marketed as a critique exposing many fallacies of capitalism
commonly held and perpetuated by economists, the media and politicians. His work has been well
received in heterodox economic circles as providing a critique of mainstream economics and aus-
terity politics. However, Chang is no radical anti-capitalist seeking an alternative system and
restricts his critique to ‘free-market’ neoliberalism. He quotes Winston Churchill, who quipped
that capitalism is the best economic system because all the others are worse (Chang, 2011,
p. 253); the same position as Thatcher’s TINA.
Chang (2011) offers amixture of post-Keynesian andneo-Austrian economics that recommends a
(collective) entrepreneurial capitalist economy operating within a welfare State. This is something
reminiscent of the post-war compromise in theWest between labour and capital, and a form of Pola-
nyian double-movement (Polanyi, 1944). Consistent with the rejection of alternatives, this approach
promises to use economic growth to benefit a wider public. Full employment and more growth is
then associated with more social benefit. According to Chang (2011, p. 253), one of the problems
with ‘free-market’ capitalism is that it ‘slows down the economy’, i.e. economic growth. A core
idea amongst his conclusions, for tweaking the system tomake it less socially divisive and objection-
able, is that: ‘Industrial policy needs to be redesigned to promote keymanufacturing sectorswith high
scope for productivity growth’ (Chang, 2011, p. 259). An approach otherwise commonly known as
productivism and associated with expansion of economic output via ever increasing inputs.
Among the things Ha-Joon Chang (2011) ‘does not tell us’ about his advocated productivist
industrial growth economy is where the inputs come from, or how it will avoid resource wars, pre-
vent the ecological crises and protect the non-human world. Typical of most non-ecological econ-
omists, his worldview excludes Nature, and has no conception of the necessary ecosystems that
sustain economies (Spash & Smith, 2019). Keynesian economics is at core based on the idea of
boosting aggregate demand (i.e. consumerism) through government expenditures to fully employ
resources (including humans and non-humans) and maximize growth, i.e. throughput of energy,
materials and so waste. The ecological consequences are far reaching but so also are the social ones.
Keynes (1930) regarded the growth economy as a temporary phenomena lasting 100 years. He
believed that growth would solve the economic problem, specified as meeting people’s absolute
needs. In the process, unethical values and undesirable behaviour would be promoted and institu-
tionalized: greed, usury and the desire for ever more money. Abolishing such practices would only
be possible on reaching the end goal. At that time:
We shall be able to rid ourselves of many of the pseudo-moral principles which have hag-ridden us for
two hundred years, by which we have exalted some of the most distasteful of human qualities into the
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position of the highest virtues. We shall be able to afford to dare to assess the money-motive at its true
value. The love of money as a possession—as distinguished from the love of money as a means to the
enjoyments and realities of life—will be recognised for what it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one
of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the
specialists of mental disease. All kinds of social customs and economic practices, affecting the distri-
bution of wealth and of economic rewards and penalties, which we now maintain at all costs, however
distasteful and unjust they may be in themselves, because they are tremendously useful in promoting
the accumulation of capital, we shall then be free, at last, to discard. […] But beware! The time for all
this is not yet. For at least another hundred years we must pretend to ourselves and to everyone that fair
is foul and foul is fair; for foul is useful and fair is not. (Keynes, 1930, p. 97)
This prescription requires that we value the useful over the good in the blind pursuit of future
wealth, ignoring our actions’ ‘own quality or their immediate effects on our own environment’
(Keynes, 1930, p. 97). In two generations transformation to a more ethical society would be per-
missible, but here Keynes appears politically and institutionally naïve, ignoring psychological,
social and political lock-in and the creation of powerful interests vested in maintenance of the
growth economy. A problematic organizational aspect is the creation of a professional managerial
class rotating jobs between business and government enabling regulatory capture. This controlling
corporate elite is what Galbraith (1967/2007) termed the technostructure.
There is another, potentially more sinister, side to the social organization of a Keynesian produc-
tivist economy that ‘they don’t tell you’, but in this case neither did Keynes. A growth economy
requires certain types of people and is not designed to cater for existing diversity (e.g. indigenous
cultures), but on this topic modern economists and growth advocates appear silent. Yet, this easily
becomes ‘economics because the economy matters’ in contrast to Schumacher’s (1973) ‘economics
as if people mattered’. Most obviously, the productivist economy discriminates against the ‘unpro-
ductive’ and ascetic. More bleakly, in connecting ideas of efficient, productivity and competitive-
ness, with an idealized workforce that is fit to the tasks of production and consumption, there is
a potentially short step from economics to eugenics. This worrisome association deserves more
attention because in times of economic and political crisis the extreme right once again offers to
become the saviour of capitalism.
The connections of productivist economics to eugenics go back to the origins of modern econ-
omics both in the USA (Leonard, 2005) and the UK (Aldrich, 2019). The rise of neoclassical econ-
omics from the late 1800s created a focus on utilitarian ethics and the pain/pleasure principle that
became individualized (i.e. as preference utilitarianism). Utilitarianism was combined with growth
and consumerism to promote hedonism as the ultimate, individual and (under methodological
individualism) societal, goal. Oxford Professor, Francis Edgeworth (1845–1926) connected this
to eugenics using his ‘Hedonic Calculus’, which recommends replacing those less able to enjoy
hedonic pleasure by individuals with a superior capacity for doing so, in order to increase societal
happiness. He was inspired by the idea of social sanctions to discourage the multiplication of the
inefficient and encourage reproduction of the most efficient (Aldrich, 2019).
Eugenics was a popular movement and Keynes joined the Cambridge Eugenic Society, as its
Treasurer, on its foundation in 1911. From 1937–1944 he held offices in the (British) Eugenics
Society – Fellow, Director, Vice-President. At the end of his life in 1946, when eugenics had fallen
from grace due to the Nazi extermination camps, he praised Galton (its founder) and claimed
eugenics was ‘the most important, significant and, I would add, genuine branch of sociology
which exists’ (Aldrich, 2019). There is some speculation that his eugenic references to the quality
of the population meant increasing the ‘best and noblest intelligences’ relative to others (Aldrich,
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2019), and offered him an ultimate means of transformation for his unethical growth society (Sing-
erman, 2016). This would match the technocracy – breeding an elite to run society – also advocated
amongst his contemporaries in the Oxbridge elite. For example, Julian Huxley promoted technoc-
racy and eugenics, in association with H.G. Wells, and this inspired his brother Aldous to write the
dystopian novel Brave New World (Huxley, 1932). However, there appears to be no explicit
eugenics policy in Keynes economic writings (Aldrich, 2019). The same is not true of other econ-
omists. Even into the 1970s, Cambridge Professor, James Meade (1907–1995) was arguing for ‘the
reduction of the relative fertility of those with low earning capacity’ (Aldrich, 2019, p. 50).
A strong State promoting a productivist fully employed economy then appears potentially
oppressive with a dark side that Chang and others (e.g. Jacobs & Mazzucato, 2016) fail to register.
A national growth economy aimed at creating a productive population is totally consistent with the
politics of having ‘the right people’ populate society. FromNazi propaganda of the 1930s through to
campaigns of modern right-wing parties and fascists in Europe today, the association of the deser-
ving, fit, hard working, nationalist is set against the undeserving, unfit, lazy, immigrant ‘other’.
Nationalism is easily connected to such political rhetoric, and both derive support from the
more common and accepted discourse promoting the competitive race for growth and leadership.
2.2. The smart competitive meritocracy
Economic growth is marketed as if a harmonious new world order were on offer, where the poorest
will join the richest. Some, like Ha-Joon Chang (2011, p. 263), advocate changing the rules to allow
poor countries ‘breaks to have a hope of catching up’. This ignores how competitive growth institu-
tionalizes and rationalizes the fight over energy,materials and ecological space. Competition is then a
good and efficient means of determining winners, whose gains are justified as being won on the basis
of their own merit. A large question mark hangs over how a stable and just world is meant to be
achieved by increasing national and corporate competition for technology, resources and markets!
The contradictions are evident in the 2020 policy agenda set by the European Commission’s
(2010) Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth. They define ‘sustainable growth’ in tra-
ditional economic terms as promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more competitive
economy.
An industrial policy for the globalisation era to improve the business environment, notably for SMEs,
and to support the development of a strong and sustainable industrial base able to compete globally.
(European Commission, 2010, p. 4)
However, the report notes the intensifying competitive pressure coming from both developed (i.e.
North American) and emerging (i.e. Chinese) economies, affecting exports and resource avail-
ability. The sustainable growth strategy requires exploiting Europe’s leadership in the race to
develop new processes and technologies before others. The European Union is noted as ‘largely
a first mover in green solutions, but its advantage is being challenged by key competitors’, and it
should maintain its lead in the market for green technologies; in fact ‘we must improve our com-
petitiveness vis-à-vis our main trading partners through higher productivity’ (European Commis-
sion, 2010, p. 12). Boosting market consumerism is central and the internet a key part of the
strategy with the vision of ‘a Digital Single Market based on fast and ultra fast internet and inter-
operable applications, with broadband access for all’ (European Commission, 2010, p. 12). The idea
of a responsible citizen, contributing to society, is defined in terms of being a good consumer buy-
ing and consuming as much and as fast as possible.
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To gear the single market to serve the Europe 2020 goals requires well functioning and well-connected
markets where competition and consumer access stimulate growth and innovation. […] Citizens must
be empowered to play a full part in the single market. This requires strengthening their ability and
confidence to buy goods and services cross-border, in particular on-line. (European Commission,
2010, p. 19)
The priorities are clear, in 30 pages, there are 84 references to markets, 83 to growth, 45 to inno-
vation, 38 to competition, 29 to technology, 17 to consuming/consumers and 14 to greening.
Sustainable growth will make ‘us’ winners in the global competition, if ‘we’ can stay ahead of
everybody else, i.e. be more productive and grow faster. Allowing poor countries to catch-up
defies the specific economic logic of competition – efficiency, innovation, copyright, private own-
ership, cost-shifting, entrepreneurship and growth as progress – with the most economically
advanced being the winners in a meritocracy. This is not, and cannot be, an inclusive project
where rich and poor all obtain global-North modes of living. Indeed, as Josef Ackermann, the
CEO of Deutsche Bank has made very clear, this is a race for leadership:
Make no mistake: a new world order is emerging. The race for leadership has already begun. For the
winners, the rewards are clear: Innovation and investment in clean energy technology will stimulate
green growth; it will create jobs; it will bring greater energy independence and national security. (State-
ment made December 2010; cited by Jaeger et al., 2011)
Make no mistake, where there are winners there will be losers, as there always have been in the geo-
politics of the competitive industrial growth economy, ‘sustainable’ or otherwise. Germany wins,
Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece lose; China wins USA loses; USA wins Europe loses; and so on.
2.3. A secure militarized system
Another ignored aspect of the competitive growth economy is how it is backed by military force, as
and when necessary, to secure supply chains, resources and markets for trading. The current pol-
itical economy is built on fossil fuel expansion. Government plans are to pour trillions of dollars in
that direction (International Energy Agency, 2014) to secure a traditional leadership position in the
growth race; a strategy backed by military concerns over security and demands from the fossil fuel
and associated industries (e.g. aerospace, automobiles). Fossil fuels must be secured, requiring mili-
tary investment.
Modern growth economies are heavilymilitarized. Twenty eight governments spend 10%ormore
of their budgets on themilitary. Table 1 shows the top ten nations bymilitary expenditure. The domi-
nant imperialist status of the USA is quite self-evident, with a military budget larger than the next
seven highestmilitary spenders combined. IfWestern Europe is taken as awhole then it ranks second
both on military spending and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The strong connections between
ranking ofmilitary expenditure andGDP continues as onemoves through such data. That is, extend-
ing beyond Table 1, the next three countries (Brazil, Italy, Canada) rank 8th, 9th and 10th by GDP
and 11th, 12th and 14th in terms of military expenditure, and so on.
The strong association of corporate industrialism with a productivist technologically driven
militarized nation State, and a permanent armament industry, was an outcome of World War
II. In 1961, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and five star General, Dwight
D. Eisenhower, made his final televised speech as President of the USA. He felt the need to
warn the nation that: ‘In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex’. The mod-
ern industrial nation State was established as combining military supremacy with advanced
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technology in a race for material growth and capital accumulation. The apologists for growth bro-
ker no discussion of the military-industrial complex, how supply chains and resources are secured
or society is oppressively structured. Yet the evidence is in the news everyday: military power dis-
plays, political and military intervention, surveillance, militarized police, violent suppression of dis-
sent, secret service supported terror, militias and coups, and ultimately war.
3. Poverty and progress: old bad, new good
Alternative ways of living are either co-opted into the economic growth paradigm or condemned as
backward or primitive. Alternative approaches to development are removed from the policy agenda
(Gudynas, 2016). A society condemned as backward and primitive is then prey to those of the more
‘advanced’ world who claim moral authority to impose ‘development’. Peoples that oppose this
‘development logic’ are deposed and dispossessed, indigenous cultures are denigrated and destroyed
and their autonomy removed. Indeed, the term primitive economies is used in an inherently dero-
gatory way associated with undesirable living conditions caricatured as ‘mud huts’ and ‘hair shirts’.
This is where the next class of passive revolutionary, apologists for growth, enter. Here we find those
who appear critical of economic growth on ecological and social grounds, but contradictorily leave
economic growth, as development, firmly in place. The ‘hair shirt’ is a repeated, societal level, meta-
phor employed rhetorically to deride alternative economies and to equate them with an undesirable
past. In particular, Kallis et al. (2012) cite the phrase as regularly employed to deride others in talks by
Tim Jackson, and similar occurrence in the work of Juliet Schor against advocates of ‘simplicity’ and
materiallyminimalist living (e.g. degrowth). Authors, such as Jackson and Schor, promote the idea of
a ‘new economy of prosperity’ (Kallis et al.. 2012), so that apparent criticism of capitalist growth is
combined with retention of some of its core structural elements and claims. The idea of a ‘new econ-
omy’ that is supposed to solve problems without changing the fundamental structure of capitalism is
prevalent amongst apologists for growth.
3.1. Growth as development: the passive revolution
As a formerWorld Bank chief economist and corporate executive, Lord Stern has heavily promoted
the growth = development synonym, which he associates with poverty alleviation. In a press inter-
view he stated:
Table 1. Top ten military nations (expenditure by country 2018).
GDP world rank
Military expenditure
Amount (millions US$) GDP (% of) Per capita (US$) Government expenditure (% of)
1 USA 1 648798 3.2% 1986 9.0%
2 China* 2 249997 1.9% 177 5.5%
3 Saudi Arabia* 19 67555 8.8% 2013 24.6%
4 India 5 66510 2.4% 49 8.7%
5 France 7 63800 2.3% 978 4.1%
6 Russia 11 61388 3.9% 426 11.4%
7 UK 6 49997 1.8% 751 4.6%
8 Germany 4 49471 1.2% 601 2.8%
9 Japan 3 46618 0.9% 367 2.5%
10 Korea, South 12 43070 2.6% 842 12.4%
Notes: Data on GDP from The World Bank, latest figures for 2017.
Data source on military expenditure Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Figures are in US $ in current prices, converted at the exchange rate for the given year.
*Figures are SIPRI estimates.
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To those who want to knock out growth from objectives, I find they’re close to reprehensible… I think
to say that we should just switch off growth is to miss big aspects of what matters about poverty. And so
it worries me. It’s also politically very naive. If you turn it into a pissing contest between growth on the
one hand and climate and environment on the other and say you’ve got to choose, you’re setting your-
self up for failure. (Confino, 2014)
This kind of rhetorical bullying ignores the history and geo-politics of economic growth as devel-
opment as well as the actual impacts it has on ‘poor people’.
The post-development school documents how equating development with growth has been an
imperialist policy, initiated by the USA for its own benefit (Sachs, 1999/2015). President Truman’s
20 January 1949 inaugural address set out the agenda for a technical and scientific programme to
assist ‘backward’ areas of the world in the context of the Cold War. The fourth objective of this
foreign policy speech set-out an agenda for promoting growth, scientific advance and industrial
progress of underdeveloped areas where ‘economic life is primitive and stagnant’ and poverty is
‘a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas’. The threat being that of becoming anti-
USA, anti-capitalist and aligned to the USSR. This became a government funded project called
the ‘Point Four Program’. Contrary to the political rhetoric of helping poor people, the actual pro-
gramme was for extraction of other countries’minerals to avoid resource shortages in the USA and
to secure the supply chains of their corporations.
Black (2016) documents howpublic–private collusion in theUSAoperated to reorder political and
legal institutions and their operation in foreign countries to favour the global spread of capitalism.
U.S. decision-makers grasped for a way to extract foreign minerals without triggering anti-imperialist
alarms, and Point Four—a systematic effort to improve conditions in the developing world—became a
chosen vehicle toward that material end. (Black, 2016)
The USA’s government field agents advanced national interests by using a time-tested procedure to
achieve resource extraction: (i) conduct geological surveys, (ii) perform laboratory tests, (iii)
implement mining operations, (iv) revise local mining laws, and (v) bring-in interested corpor-
ations from the USA (Black, 2016).
Rather than simply empowering and enriching lives, development policy has also denigrated
and destroyed the cultures of non-industrialized countries, livelihoods of the rural and materially
poor, and removed their autonomy. Sachs (1999/2015) differentiates the materially poor into what
can be described as living frugally, suffering deprivation and living under systems of economic
scarcity. The implications are summarized by Spash and Smith (2019) as follows. Traditional
societies have economic systems of social provisioning that are structured on frugality and
sufficiency. Interventions to ‘develop’ their economic circumstances have typically resulted in
expropriation and forms of primitive accumulation. Culture is destroyed along with sustainable
livelihoods. Land is grabbed, resources exploited, agriculture is industrialized and the environ-
ment is polluted. The result is exponential growth in urban slum dwellers, more than a billion
on conservative UN estimates more than a decade ago (Davis, 2006, p. 23). A class of people
ready for exploitation as commodified labour due to their newly-created wage dependency and
their new lives as those saved from ‘poverty’ to live in the economy of material scarcity measured
by money. As discussed below, the World Bank has focussed on increasing money income as an
improvement that removes people from poverty, but ignores the structural and social changes
that typically transform self-sufficiency in rural communities within social networks into indus-
trial dependency in urban slums as isolated individuals living in polluted environments, working
under dehumanizing productivist conditions.
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Sachs (1999/2015) explains how the growth = development agenda has been repeatedly adjusted
and revised in response to problems becoming overwhelmingly obvious. Sustainable development
then appears as a response to the environmental criticism of the 1970s and specifically the limits to
growth literature (Meadows et al., 1972). The World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment, established in 1983 by the UN, under chairwoman Gro Brundtland, produced the widely
employed definition of sustainable development, but this is normally quoted without the follow-
on sentence. The two together read as follows:
Sustainable development seeks to meet the needs and aspirations of the present without compromising
the ability to meet those of the future. Far from requiring the cessation of economic growth it recognises
that the problems of poverty and underdevelopment cannot be solved unless we have a new era of
growth in which developing countries play a large role and reap large benefits. (World Commission
on Environment and Development 1987, Chapter 1, para. 49)
The Commission recognized no insurmountable conflict with the environment and they looked
forward to a five to ten fold increase in economic growth. Neither would growth in the global econ-
omy exclude expansion of the industrially developed countries’ economies.
The medium-term prospects for industrial countries are for growth of 3–4 per cent, the minimum that
international financial institutions consider necessary if these countries are going to play a part in
expanding the world economy. Such growth rates could be environmentally sustainable if industrialised
nations can continue the recent shifts in the context of their growth towards less material—and energy
—intensive activities and the improvement of their efficiency in using materials and energy. (World
Commission on Environment and Development 1987, Chapter 2 para. 32)
This claimed ‘solution’ to social-ecological crises, that ‘decoupling’ economic growth from environ-
mental destruction is feasible, has become increasingly common in recent times, because otherwise
the contradictions become overwhelmingly obvious. It provides the magic bullet solution (for criti-
cisms of decoupling see Fletcher & Rammelt, 2017; Giampietro, 2019; Parrique et al., 2019).
Over the history of engagement by the UN on environment and development, going back to the
1972 conference, the discourse has been pacified and alternatives to capitalism, and more generally
economic growth, delegitimized. Early principles claimed concern over futurity, equity, public par-
ticipation, and environmental integrity. Some affirmation of intrinsic values in Nature was also
recurrent (e.g. as in IUCN, UNEP, andWWF, 1980 Sec.9 ft.nt.3, Sec.10 figure; United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly, 2012, p. 38). However, circa 1980, the emphasis became utilitarian use, economic
market instruments, natural capital maintenance, production and economic efficiency. Thus, the
support is for neoliberal Green Growth not post-growth, degrowth or post-development. This
then relates to a conflict and divorce between what may be believed by individuals and what is
regarded as acceptable to express in international political and administrative circles, such as
those of the UN (Craig et al., 1993). To be accepted, play a role and have a seat at the table requires
conforming to the system and its discourse. The result being a new environmental pragmatism
matching the rise of neoliberalism (Spash, 2009; Spash & Aslaksen, 2015). Hence, there should
be little surprise that the 2015 UN Resolution on sustainable development goals promotes the oxy-
moron of ‘sustainable economic growth’, uses the rhetoric of decoupling to dismiss environmental
concerns and seeks 7% growth rates.
The underlying claim that growth is the ‘solution’ to poverty has two false but common subsidi-
ary claims. First, the argument is that the more the economy grows the more happiness will
increase. This has been effectively deconstructed by Easterlin (1974, 1995, 2003) and Hirsch
(1977). The basic point being that hedonic pleasures are limited in their relationship to well-
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being. Happiness via income has relative meaning of worth in relation to the status of others so that
more income for all does not mean more happiness for all (Easterlin, 1995). In addition, status free,
or non-positional, contributions to well-being are undervalued by the materialist and money
oriented growth society. People then invest in gaining things that do not make them happier
(material stuff, bigger objects, the latest things) while side-lining substantive non-material contri-
butors (e.g. friends, family, relationships, health).
Once it is recognised that individuals are unaware of some of the forces shaping their choices, it can be
no longer argued that they will successfully maximize their well-being. (Easterlin, 2003, p. 11181)
Such a conclusion runs counter to the claims of those supporting liberal and neoliberal political
ideologies as well as economists supporting consumer sovereignty and minimalist government.
Second, is the myth that income inequity is addressed by economic growth because of trickle
down. This is the myth that rich people allow the crumbs to fall from the table that enrich the
poor. The persistence of poverty and increasing inequity in the richest nations offers the counter
experience, as does the dependency of the wealthy and wealthy nations on exploitation of the
poor and poorer nations for their labour and resources. Moreover, there is nothing in economic
theory to support trickle down. Even Stiglitz, part of the establishment who firmly believes growth
= development, had to admit that, after thirty years of the World Bank trying:
The evidence was overwhelming that growth did not necessarily reduce poverty. Trickle-down econ-
omics did not necessarily work. If growth was accompanied by increasing inequality, poverty could
actually increase. The problem was that many of the Washington Consensus policies that the Bank
and the IMF had argued for in the past had contributed to—or had at least been associated with—
increasing inequality. (Stiglitz, 2009, p. 144)
3.2. Prosperity after growth: the passive revolutionary
A widely cited and apparently growth critical work is, ecological economist, Tim Jackson’s book
Prosperity Without Growth. Jackson’s arguments appear to be anti-growth with strong critiques
of the prospects for decoupling the economy from environmental damages. He adopts a post-
growth position with the recommendation of a ‘new economy’ based on services. Unfortunately,
this might not actually address the problem because, in practice, the move to such economies
has been ‘systematically linked to an increase in per capita energy and material consumption’
(Krausmann et al., 2008, p. 197). So the form of alternative economy is in question, but the impli-
cation is that some serious restructuring is necessary, and, with growth gone, apparently this means
the abolition of capitalism. However, Jackson (2009, pp. 197–202) fudges the issue, weakly joking
that he is actually advocating ‘capitalism, but not as we know it’, and asking rhetorically ‘Does it
really matter?’ Capital accumulation appears as an optional extra for capitalism, while capitalism
itself remains basically unaddressed and undefined.
Jackson advocates contract and convergence, stating that, ‘A key motivation for rethinking pros-
perity in the advanced economies is tomake room formuch-needed growth in poorer nations’ (Jack-
son, 2009, p. 175). He equates economic growth with development. In particular, he notes how self-
reported happiness studies show increases in happiness before it declines as growth continues.
These [life satisfaction] data underline one of the key messages of this book. There is no case to abandon
growth universally. But there is a strong case for the developed nations to make room for growth in
poorer countries. It is in these poorer countries that growth really does make a difference. (Jackson,
2009, p. 41)
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Now, this position is no different from that of Keynes, Stern or the international pro-growth lob-
bies. Yet the practical implications are left out. What does it mean in practice to advocate growth as
the means of poverty alleviation?
According to the UN there are 1.34 billion people (19% of humanity) across 105 countries living
in multidimensional poverty – reflecting acute deprivation in health, education and standard of liv-
ing.1 The World Bank’s preferred measure of extreme poverty is the US dollar. The threshold set in
1990 at $1/day, increased to $1.25 in 2005, adjusted in 2011 to $1.90 purely for inflation and
exchange rate changes, i.e. they claim $1.90 (2011) buys the same as $1.25 (2005) in poor countries.
The World Bank (2018) then triumphantly proclaims growth policies have halved extreme poverty
since 1990. Others disagree with their approach and claims, while pointing out the increasing
inequities are actually created by growth.
That the cost of living varies by country is recognized by the 2018 World Bank report including
higher thresholds – $3.20 per day and $5.50 per day – to represent extreme poverty in lower-
income and upper-middle-income countries. As shown in Table 2, 46% of humanity live below
$5.50 per day. If the requirement is moved higher to $10/day then 71%. Such figures hide distribu-
tional inequity, regional and national differences. Table 2 shows greater income poverty amongst
rural populations, while some countries may have much higher than 10% in extreme poverty. India,
for example, has over 30% below the $1.25/day threshold, while growth there between 1980 and
2016 increased the income share of the richest 10% by more than 20%, giving them 55% of all
income (Nilsen, 2018).
What all this means for Jackson’s call to address poverty by economic growth is mass expansion
of the industrial economy for the vast majority of humanity. In order to reach the basic poverty
threshold of the USA would require growth for almost the entire world’s population on an on-
going basis. Even a level 60% below that threshold (i.e. $10/day) would mean imposing the growth
economy on 71% of the world’s population. He is certainly not then calling for Prosperity Without
Growth! However, the issue here is not only the hidden advocacy of such a massive global expan-
sion of economic production, but also that growth itself has been highly problematic as a means for
addressing poverty. As Nilsen (2018) notes the majority of the world’s poor live in countries that
have experienced strong economic growth and the growth strategies these countries have practised
Table 2. Population in poverty.
Population
(%)
Income/yr
(US $) Source
Population below US$1.90 per day
according to World Bank
10.0 694 http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview
Indian population below international
poverty line of US$1.25 per day 2007–
2011
32.7 456 http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/india_statistics.
html
Population below US$2 per day in rural
areas
60.0 730 http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/briefingpapers/
ruralpov/vitalstats.shtml
Population below US$3.20 per day
according to World Bank
26.3 1168 World Bank (2018, p. 8)
Population below US$5.50 per day
according to World Bank
46.0 2007 World Bank (2018, p. 8)
Population on US$10 per day or less 71.0 3650 https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/23/
seven-in-ten-people-globally-live-on-10-or-less-per-
day/
USA 2016 Federal Poverty Guidelines
income threshold below
11880 http://familiesusa.org/product/federal-poverty-
guidelines#2015
USA 2017 Official Poverty rate 12.3 https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2018/
demo/p60-263.html
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create and reproduce poverty. In addition, as shown in Table 2, poverty has not been removed even
from the richest nations in the world and in some it is institutionalized and increasing (e.g. Jack-
sons’ own country, the UK, the sixth richest nation in the world by GDP, has been criticized for
increases in extreme poverty, while, as shown in Table 2 the USA, the richest country in the
world, has over 12% officially living in poverty).2
4. Organizing a green and growing ‘new’ economy
That environmental problems are an all pervasive part of modern economic systems is a core lesson
of ecological economics based on the laws of thermodynamics and conservation of matter. Energy
and materials that go into the economic system are not destroyed but transformed, degraded in
terms of human usefulness, and returned to the environment in equal mass. The correlation
between GDP and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions directly results from this basic biophysical rea-
lity. Such natural scientific understanding is ignored by economists’ externality theory which treats
pollution as a minor aberration in an otherwise perfectly functioning market system (Spash, 2021).
As one-off correctible market failures pollutants are treated as singular policy problems not sys-
temic failures.
The resulting policy reductionism has facilitated exclusion of all other environmental problems
by climate change, and then reducing GHG mitigation policy to focus on CO2 (typically termed
‘carbon’) as the principle concern. That even this singular gas is a systemic problem related to
the growth economy, rather than a one-off aberration, seems rather self-evident. The majority of
world CO2 emissions comes from the same handful of high GDP nations as shown in Table 1.
These are China (30%), USA (15%), India (7%), Russia (5%), Japan (4%) and Germany (2%). As
a collective the EU28 would rank 3rd (10%) with highest polluters Germany followed by the
UK, Italy and France (around 1% each). The nine highest CO2 emitting countries rank in the
top eleven countries with the highest GDP.3 Yet the institutionalization of a passive revolution
has sought to effectively turn reality on its head to claim economic growth as the solution to,
not the cause of, human induced climate change.
4.1. Better growth, better climate: the green passive revolution part I
The Paris Agreement (Article 2) has a stated aim of holding global average temperature increases to
well below 2°C, and an aspiration of pursuing ‘efforts to limit this to 1.5°C, in order to reduce the
risk and impacts from climate change’. Article 2 is qualified by the phrase: ‘in the context of sus-
tainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty’. Indeed the whole Paris Agreement is set
within the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which promote economic
growth, technology, industrialization and energy use (Spash, 2016b, 2016a). SDG Goal 8 is to sus-
tain per capita economic growth at a rate of at least 7% GDP per annum in the least developed
countries. The expected environmental destruction is to be addressed by the ‘endeavour to decou-
ple economic growth from environmental degradation’. This would require absolute decoupling
which is simply impossible for the SDG envisioned industrial economy promoted in Goal 9. The
Paris Agreement follows suit with techno-optimism and growth; Article 10 states that: ‘Accelerat-
ing, encouraging and enabling innovation is critical for an effective, long-term global response to
climate change and promoting economic growth and sustainable development’.
The resource extracting, fossil-fuel driven economies of the world are claiming they can stop the
exponential growth path of GHG emissions, while making no substantive change in the structure of
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the growth economy or society, and indeed by promoting capitalist financial markets as ‘the sol-
ution’ (Spash, 2016b). At the UNFCCC COP25 conference in Madrid 2019 the major contention
and dispute concerned what the doublespeak of Paris called ‘internationally transferred mitigation
outcomes’ (clause 108 and Article 6). This was the term that appeared in the Paris Agreement
instead of emissions trading, carbon markets, cap and trade or offsets. In short the Paris Agreement
is being directed towards establishing financial markets based on carbon trading because this offers
a business as usual approach.
For example, if aviation were a nation State it would be the seventh largest CO2 emitter.
4 Yet
increasing flying is at the leading edge of growth. Manufacturers expect to double the passenger
aircraft fleet, with ‘emerging’ economies, and especially China, tripling those flying. The cost,
$5.3 trillion by 2036 for the new commercial fleet, and more for training over half a million new
pilots.5 Already 550 new airports are planned or under construction, combined with new runways
and airport expansion there are an estimated 1200 new airport infrastructure projects (Smith, 2019,
p. 18). Christiana Figueres – former Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC and now member of
Richard Branson’s B-Team – justifies this massive expansion as ‘carbon neutral growth’ (Figueres
& Tubiana, 2016). The means on offer for claiming the possibility of such neutrality are the notor-
iously problematic market-mechanisms of carbon trading and offsetting (Spash, 2010, 2015; Spash
& Theine, 2018).
Similarly, the highly publicized report by Stern et al. (2006) advocated emissions trading while
pronouncing that: ‘Tackling climate change is the pro-growth strategy for the longer term, and it
can be done in a way that does not cap the aspirations for growth of rich or poor countries’ (Stern
et al., 2006, p. viii). In 2014, the self-aggrandizing Global Commission on the Economy and Cli-
mate (GCEC) published Better Growth Better Climate: The New Climate Economy Report with
Stern as lead economist. Apparently ‘ … set up to examine whether it is possible to achieve lasting
economic growth while also tackling the risks of climate change’ (GCEC, 2014, p. 8). Actually, a
purely rhetorical question because the answer was already given by Stern in 2006. Unsurprisingly
then, ‘The report’s conclusion is that countries at all levels of income now have the opportunity to
build lasting economic growth at the same time as reducing the immense risks of climate change’
(GCEC, 2014). Their 2018 report headlines ‘the inclusive growth story’, but the real concern
seems to be capturing government investment for corporate business interests by diverting ‘US
$90 trillion to build the right infrastructure now’ in order to ‘deliver a new era of economic
growth’ (GCEC, 2018, p. 10). The ‘new’ growth seems very much like business-as-usual: rapid
technological innovation, infrastructure investment, increased resource productivity, jobs, econ-
omic savings, competitiveness and market opportunities (GCEC, 2018, p. 8). The inclusiveness
also seems illusionary because, once again, the competitive race is on: ‘Leaders are already seizing
the exciting economic and market opportunities of the new growth approach’ and ‘laggards’ are
losing out (GCEC, 2018, p. 9).
Stern and others have been keen to promote climatic disaster prevention as bringing economic
prosperity. Similarly, Jaeger et al. (2011) describe GHG emissions reduction as a new opportunity
to increase growth rates. A key part of such stories is that pricing and marketing non-market goods,
internalizing externalities via full cost accounting, and pricing ‘carbon’, will correct market failures,
increase efficiency and provide a Green and growing economy. In the process there is money to be
made from GHG commodification and for bankers and financiers.
Capital markets, banks and other financial institutions will have a vital role in raising and allocating the
trillions of dollars needed to finance investment in low-carbon technology and the companies
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producing the new technologies. […] Trading on global carbon markets is now worth over $10bn
annually. (Stern et al., 2006, p. 270)
As Hirsch (1977) pointed-out long ago, there is no economic welfare gain from such ‘defensive
expenditures’. More resources for environmental protection (like those on the military or police)
are not signs of increasing human well-being but societal failure. The more pollution created,
the more clean-up activities required and the higher is GDP, because it merely measures activity,
not why activity is required. Stern and colleagues make a most basic economic error in claiming
GDP growth due to attempting to prevent a human induced climatic disaster is a good thing.
There is also a strong underlying claim that price-making markets can reflect ‘true costs’. This
form of market has prices resulting from ‘negotiations’ between actors (e.g. firms-consumers;
employer-employee) in contrast to being set by an administrative, or other, authority (Polanyi,
1957). The GCEC (2014, p. 42) state that ‘Competitive markets in which prices properly reflect
the full costs of production are vital to enable resources to flow to where they are most productive’.
In order for prices to ‘properly reflect the full costs’ would require knowing all the damages related
to all the GHG pollutants in the world across time and space for every level of production in order
to create a marginal shadow price. As discussed in the next section, this engages in universal com-
mensurability and converting everything (e.g. loss of life) into money values, and means planning
all prices via explicit cost calculations (Spash, 2002). Regardless of ethical concerns, the technical
problems are totally insurmountable and the idea absolutely impracticable, but calls for ‘full cost
accounting of externalities’ keep appearing (e.g. GCEC, 2018). The only way to interpret such
claims is as a rhetorical power play, aimed at convincing non-economists that markets are efficient
resource allocators, and where markets fail they can be corrected by expert informed price
adjustments.
The GCEC (2014) State ‘we can create lasting economic growth’, but who are we? In this case
those speaking for the ‘global we’ are a political elite (two majors, five ex-heads of State, two associ-
ated with the UN), thirteen financers and bankers and four leaders of international organizations
(World Bank, IEA, OECD, ITUC), plus Lord Stern. They are backed-up by ‘The Economic Advi-
sory Panel’ comprising nine economics professors/Nobel winners and six other experts in econ-
omics/finance (in total two women, thirteen men). GCEC is a mainstream economics lobby
group for international financers and businessmen. Ultimately their concern is the threat to and
protection of the capital accumulating growth economy, above all else.
In the long term, if climate change is not tackled, growth itself will be at risk. (GCEC, 2014, p. 9).
The rhetoric of environmental and social concern thinly veils the aim of getting government funds
for the transition to a ‘new economy’ that will be socially and economically unchanged, and merely
produce different products, while trillions of dollars are poured into corporate pockets.
4.2. Nature as a financial capital asset: the green passive revolution part II
In 2011, the UNEP initiated a campaign for the ‘Green Economy’, with a report over 600 pages long
(UNEP, 2011b), aimed at influencing the 2012 Rio Plus 20 meeting. This includes expressions of
concern for the poor, the seriousness of environmental problems and the need for change. For
the UN the Green Economy ‘is a new development path that is based on sustainability principles
and ecological economics’ (UNEP, 2011a, p. 1). However, the approach is built around market
mechanisms and economists’ (or rather accountants’) ability to conduct shadow pricing to value
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the environment – ‘a common language of comprehensive ecosystem valuation’ – and to institu-
tionalize those values via private property rights for private gain.
In the transition to a Green Economy, policymakers should ensure that the full range of goods and ser-
vices provided by ecosystems, including those which are currently non-monetised, are fully integrated
in decision making and public policy. […] Placing a value on ecosystem services through mechanisms
that facilitate investment in ecosystems will at the same time benefit local people and the private sector
who are rewarded for good environmental stewardship. (UNEP, 2011a, p. 3)
The mythical full cost accounting is central. The UNEP (2011a, p. 7) makes clear that they want to
use ‘economic models for wealth creation, to focus increasingly on the value of ecosystem goods
and services and natural capital’. They believe that, ‘Compared with previous development
paths, the uniqueness of a Green Economy is that it can directly turn natural capital into economic
value whilst maintaining it, and conduct total cost accounting’ (UNEP, 2011a, p. 8). Ecologists can
be replaced by accountants as the environment neatly slips off the agenda and is replaced by
growth, jobs, capital investment and wealth accumulation.
Neither is the growth model new. Growth is designated Green because it will promote
specific types of productivism (e.g. solar and wind electricity generation, electric cars, digital
economies) assumed, but not shown, to have lower environmental impacts (e.g. on cars see
Morgan, 2020). This does nothing to address the scale of energy and material throughput, social
impacts of accelerating the mode of living and continually introducing new technologies. Nor
does it address how advancing new interventions into the environment destroys natural sys-
tems’ structure and functioning, and partially substitutes for this with technology dependent
upon low entropy concentrated minerals (e.g. fossil fuels), while causing an increase in
unwanted surprise events. Thus, arguments for decoupling and circular economies fail to
address the relationships between human systems and ecosystems (Giampietro, 2019). The con-
cern here is not really maintaining ecological or environmental systems, but once again a finan-
cially driven growth economy.
The UNEP’s association of their Green Economy with ecological economics relates to research-
ers who have promoted the adoption of natural capital as a means of reflecting ecological value
(Jansson et al., 1994) and claim to have valued the worlds ecosystems (Costanza et al., 1997). Criti-
cism of such work has extended from the actual studies (e.g. Norgaard & Bode, 1998; Toman, 1998)
to the more general unscientific form of new environmental pragmatism that this entails (Spash,
2013). Natural capital is also a long contested concept (Spash & Clayton, 1997), and the adoption
of the capital approach from mainstream economics highly problematic.
The mainstream economic argument is that, even in the absence of any technological progress,
exhaustible resources do not pose a fundamental problem if reproducible man-made capital is
sufficiently substitutable for natural capital (Dasgupta & Heal, 1979; Hartwick, 1977; Solow,
1974). In terms of sustainability criterion, the concern is to achieve a non-declining income flow
from capital which maintains or increases utility. If natural capital is reduced then man-made capi-
tal will need to compensate for the yield lost. Thus, the Hartwick (1977) rule suggests achieving
intertemporal efficiency in resource allocation by investing depletable-resource rents in man-
made capital, and so maintaining a constant consumption stream. However, the simple Hartwick
rule depends upon man-made capital: (i) failing to depreciate, (ii) being a substitute for, rather than
a complement to, natural capital, and (iii) being unrelated to rather than produced from natural
capital (Victor, 1991). The self-evident lack of realism is ignored. Instead an extreme position
on substitution is adopted by the capital approach, namely that:
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We can pass on less environment so long as we offset this loss by increasing the stock of roads and
machinery, or other man-made (physical) capital. Alternatively, we can have fewer roads and factories
so long as we compensate by having more wetlands or mixed wood lands or more education. (Turner
et al., 1994, p. 56)
As Munda (1997, p. 217) has stated this weak sustainability approach requires a very strong
assumption, namely perfect substitutability between the different forms of capital. All values are
equated and everything is made commensurate and can be substituted.
4.3. Do nought economics: the passive revolutionary
Kate Raworth’s book, Doughnut Economics, is entirely oriented around economic growth and criti-
cisms of mainstream economics. She associates economic growth with social and environmental
problems, and planetary boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009). Various links, loosely drawn and
briefly made, connect to an ecological economics perspective, but primarily the anti-growth
work of Herman Daly. However, when recounting having to choose between Green growth and
degrowth (mentioned once), Raworth (2017/2018, p. 244) goes on to sympathetically, if critically,
discuss the former, while totally dismissing the latter. In the penultimate chapter her position is
made explicit ‘Be Agnostic About Growth’ she proclaims. Her attempt to distinguish this from
apathy leads to a definition that claims she wants to be ‘agnostic in the sense of designing an econ-
omy that promotes human prosperity whether GDP is going up, down, or holding steady’ (Raw-
orth, 2017/2018, p. 245). Her final recommendations for a future economy provide a mix of
ecological modernization, Green Economy and techno-optimism.
On her website, Raworth claims the mantel of being a ‘renegade economist’, but her apologetics
for growth are clear in the linked blogs: ‘GDP could grow, so long as it remained compatible with
staying within social and planetary boundaries’.6 This fundamentally misunderstands the role of
capital accumulation, corporations, profit seeking, competition and consumerism in the structure
of the modern economy. Despite passing references to Karl Marx (Raworth, 2017/2018, p. 88,142,
165, 272), her book makes no connection between systemic issues and the structure of capitalism.
Capitalism is mentioned in passing a dozen times, but it is never defined in the book nor regarded
as a serious concern; indeed for Raworth, like other apologists for growth, it can be redesigned to a
new updated version. All the criticisms of growth that she references appear irrelevant because
Raworth’s position is basically that there are no a priori problems with economic growth itself,
this is something that does or does not result from economic practice, a side issue to the practical
problem of designing the right (capitalist) economy. She asserts, with no evidence at all, that: ‘No
country has ever ended human deprivation without a growing economy’ (Raworth, 2017/2018,
p. 245); which is an amazingly ahistorical and ill-informed statement, and if she believed this to
be true it would seem to commit her to growth not agnosticism. Indeed, the evidence shows
that no growth economy has ever ended human deprivation. What totally passes-by Raworth in
making this claim is the role that economic growth has played in causing inequality and
deprivation.
Raworth also exemplifies how apologists for growth argue around issues, rather than directly
addressing them. For example, Meadows et al.’s (1972) limits to growth thesis is mentioned
(Raworth, 2017/2018, pp. 154–155), but emphasis is placed on pollution not resources. The idea of
a ‘circular economy’ is later promoted with rhetorical claims of potential 98% efficiency (Raworth,
2017/2018, pp. 220–222), which merely reproduces the fallacies of closed systems thinking inherent
in the macroeconomic circular flow diagram of GDP, criticized earlier in her book. The text then
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evidences repeated failures to understand the logic of the critical literature cited.7 In order to counter
material reality, ‘knowledge’ is introduced as if it could avoid the laws of physics. Despite
Georgescu-Roegen (1971) receiving passing acclamation (Raworth, 2017/2018, p. 252), the impli-
cations of economic growth for materials and energy throughput, and the role of entropy in the econ-
omic process, are basically absent or bypassed with another bout of rhetorical flourish. The fact that
Georgescu-Roegen (1979/1995) concluded in favour of degrowth is also totally ignored.
Faith in economic prosperity through capitalism is an underlying theme. Despite critical reflec-
tions on neoliberalism, and linking it to the neo-Austrian economists of the Mont Pèlerin Society
(for more depth see Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009), she supports the core Austrian economic and neo-
liberal belief in entrepreneurs as central economic actors, business as the source of innovation and
technology as progress. Thus, digital futures, robots and knowledge economies are combined, to
suggest a decoupled economy that saves the basic capitalist structure, as new corporate forms
enable the Davos elite to become socially and environmentally responsible in the belief that they
will happily reform themselves and stop shifting-costs on to others.
As a senior associate at the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, Raworth unsur-
prisingly leaves a large role for business and corporate entrepreneurs as the future leaders. That
Institute’s website states their commitment to working with multinational businesses.8 Their clients
include major corporations and financial interests (e.g. Shell, Coca-Cola, Unilever, Deloitte, Gen-
eral Electric and Nestle). Connecting to the Davos elite, Raworth has contributed to the World
Economic Forum, where her ‘renegade’ claims are dropped, and mild reform appears in an ecologi-
cal modernist mode of Green corporate capitalism.
George Monbiot has claimed Raworth to be the Keynes of this century.9 Her book bears no com-
parison to his work at all. It is a popularly written collection of anecdotally and metaphorically
structured arguments, presented as a series of stories, lacking depth of attention to cited sources
and offering no coherent economic theory. Typical of apologists for growth it offers comforting
pictures of positive futures that will build upon the basic structures of Western capitalism and sus-
tain it. Therein lies the contradiction, the arguments for alternatives stand in opposition to the
arguments for keeping business-as-usual. The only proximity to Keynes is in an attempt to save
the capitalist system from itself by a posteriori corrections to its inherent tendency for exploitation
of, and cost-shifting onto, ‘others’. Of course, as discussed above, Keynes himself was the ultimate
apologist for growth.
5. Concluding discussion
Economic growth is synonymous with progress and development, yet the phenomena is a relatively
new one. The modern economic growth paradigm was popularized after World War II both aca-
demically and politically. Academically, Keynes (1936/1978) invented macroeconomics and for-
malized the operations of modern capitalism, including the role of money as already recognized
by Marx (1867). Keynesian economics justified government intervention to stimulate growth. Pol-
itically, the foreign policy of the USA adopted economic growth as synonymous with development,
and development with progress, as a means of international intervention (Black, 2016). Organiz-
ations such as the IMF and the World Bank helped push the imperialist agenda (Sachs, 1999/
2015). The Cold War added an arms race. As a geo-political tool, the capital accumulating growth
economy had soon spread globally from market capitalism to centrally planned productivism.
Capitalist price-making markets contribute their own dynamics of commodification, compe-
tition over market share, power over suppliers and consumers, cost-shifting and profit seeking.
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Structured to maximize ‘exchange values’, such markets must grow because the reasons for capital
investment is to increase returns through the exchange process. Thus, the on-going promotion of
economic growth as development by Western governments has promoted materialism, consumer-
ism, trade, commodification of Nature, reduction of values to monetary metrics, corporate profi-
teering, the military-industrial complex and cultural imperialism.
The growth economy is a hegemonic power structure. Hegemony is a political concept describ-
ing an ideological position that comes to dominate,
to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society – bringing about not only a
unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, […] thus creating the
hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups. (Gramsci, 1971,
pp. 181–182)
The consensus across political systems and parties is that economic growth forms the unquestion-
able goal of modern society to which all should aspire. More than this, the expressed belief is that
imposing economic growth on all others is a moral duty to help them ‘develop’, and not to do so is
reprehensible (as noted by Lord Stern).
The basic physical, social, economic and psychological criticisms of the resulting economic sys-
tem, as raised in the 1970s, have never been addressed. As social-ecological economists have repeat-
edly noted, most economists have wilfully ignored the biophysical reality of economic processes
and the social structure of actual economies (Spash, 2017). As social, ecological and economic crises
increasingly become actualized so do the pundits with their old growth wine in new economy bot-
tles – neo-Keynesian productivism, climate economy, Green growth, Green economy, Green new
deal, new deal for nature, sustainable development, sustainable economic growth, bio-economy,
circular economy, digital economy, knowledge economy. Whatever the title the contradiction
remains between sustaining capital accumulating industrial growth and reducing the social-eco-
logical impacts of its material and energy throughput.
For the top few per cent of the worlds’ population who own the vast majority of its wealth, and
run its corporate businesses’s, ecological and economic crises are just another opportunity to make
money. One person’s loss is another’s gain. Disasters are potential trade openings for the business
men and women with the right goods and services in the right place at the right time (Spash, 2012).
That is the whole thrust the EC’s 2020 vision, GCEC and Stern’s new climate economy and the
UN’s Green Economy. Trillions of dollars are just waiting to be grabbed in the transition to the
next form of capitalism. One may speculate as to their motives but they presumably believe in either
short termism or that they can survive regardless of general and widespread catastrophes and
suffering of others; in both cases there appear to be psychopathic and sociopathic traits in the cor-
porate world (Bakan, 2004; Black, 2001).
The elite of financiers, bankers, billionaires and corporate managers appear less concerned about
social-ecological crises than that the disenfranchised majority might get rebellious and demand a
reorganization of the economic and political system. Rather than circuitous economic growth
and promises of trickle down they might demand redistribution, social justice, goods and services
in-kind, public ownership and social provisioning to meet social needs. The hard-line response is
alliance with the right-wing, shutting borders to immigrants, designating critics as terrorists and
threats to national security, authoritarian control using securitization via police and military
power. This is an on-going process across nations, includingWestern democracies. The soft-option
is a continuing series of passive revolutions to appease subordinate segments of society with
mild reformist agendas from the top that keep the elite in power. What the review and critical
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reflection presented here shows is the prevalence of such conformity across a range of societal
actors and how this involves the absorption of potential revolutionary or oppositional intellectuals
and leaders.
The resulting policy recommendations represent superficial change that does nothing to address
the fundamental social-ecological crises created by the structure of modern economies and their
problematic systems of social provisioning (see my other article in this special forum: Spash,
2020b). That systemic change is necessary is well founded on basic biophysical principles whose
importance for sustained social provisioning is core to ecological economics. Recognizing how sys-
temic change is being prevented is necessary to activate counter mechanism to achieve social-eco-
logical transformation. What has been shown here is that any serious transformation away from
growthmania will need to address a set of international organizations ideologically committed to
economic growth that is integrally linked to corporate interests and the militarized nation
State. In addition, a range of supposedly radical and critical thinkers can be identified as compro-
mised partners in maintaining the system. The apologists for growth help secure the passive
revolution.
Notes
1. http://hdr.undp.org/en//2018-MPI
2. The UK’s failures were cited by the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights
16 November, 2018 https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=
23884&LangID=E
3. Switching to total GHGs, from just CO2, and including emissions from land use change and forestry
pushes Indonesia and Brazil up the league table into fifth and sixth positions, but the list of countries
accounting for about 70% of GHG emission, and those at the top, remains the same.
4. https://www.fern.org/climate/aviation/ [Accessed 20/07/2019]
5. http://news.airwise.com/story/airbus-says-world-jet-fleet-to-double [Accessed 02/09/2017].
6. Accessed 3rd February 2018, https://www.humansandnature.org/economy.
7. The problems with the circular economy and its failure to understand biophysical reality are explained
by Giampietro (2019) with reference to the work of Georgescu-Roegen.
8. Accessed 3rd February 2018, https://www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/about/who-we-work-with/clients.
9. Accessed 14th May 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/12/doughnut-
growth-economics-book-economic-model.
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